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Abstract
Many politicians blame physician dispensing (PD) to increase health care expenditure and to under-
mine independence of drug prescription and income leading to a suboptimal medication. Therefore,
PD is not allowed in most OECD countries. In Switzerland, PD is allowed in some regions depend-
ing on the density of pharmacies. This enables to investigate the di®erence in prescribing behavior
between physician which gain income from prescribing a speci¯c drug and their colleagues which
prescribe the drug but do not sell it. Because the considered drugs are bioequivalent we focus on the
economic consequence of PD. We analyze the prescribing behavior of Swiss physicians using cross-
sectional data between 2005 and 2007 for three important agents. The results support our hypothesis
that dispensing physicians have a higher probability of prescribing the drug with the (most likely)
higher margin compared to non-dispensing physicians. Further, generic drugs are prescribed more
often to patients with higher cost-sharing while patients' cost-sharing is less in°uential with PD.
High-income patients face a much higher probability to receive the brand-name drug due to their
lower marginal utility of income. Today's administered reimbursement prices for generics seem to be
high enough to gain physicians for prescribing generics because of their high margins.
JEL-Classi¯cation: Physician dispensing, prescribing behavior, generics, brand-name drugs
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1 Introduction
In most OECD countries, prescribing and dispensing of drugs is strictly separated between physicians and
pharmacies. However, some Swiss cantons (counties/districts) are exceptional as physicians are allowed
to dispense drugs directly to their patients. This system will be referred to as `physician dispensing'
(PD) in the remainder of this paper. Drawbacks of PD are that ¯nancial gains might incite physicians
to prescribe too many, too expensive or even clinically inappropriate drugs. The adverse consequences
for society are ine±ciently high drug expenditures or lower health outcomes. The advantages of PD are
easier access to drugs and increased choice among drug providers. Acknowledging the strong position of
physicians as advisers in medical needs, many cantons require them to inform patients about their right
to obtain their prescription and buy the drugs in a pharmacy of their choice.
This research analyzes the in°uence of physician dispensing on the choice between generic or brand-
name drugs, which has never been done on Swiss micro-data as far as we know. The drugs chosen for
analysis are bioequivalent and easy to substitute, so both versions are assumed to be equal in terms
of clinical bene¯ts. Expenditures for prescription drugs are covered by basic health insurance which is
compulsory in Switzerland. The coverage only kicks in after the annual deductible is exceeded. The
deductibles range from CHF 300 { 2,500 (e 200 { 1,666) and are chosen by the patient at the beginning
of the year. On top of the deductible, there is a 10 percent co-payment up to a max of CHF 700 (e
467) per year. For certain brand-name drugs, the co-payment was increased to 20 percent during our
observation period. In consequence, some patients have stronger interest in receiving cheaper drugs than
others. This allows us to analyze the extent to which the prescribing physician regards the patient's
interest as her own (physician agency).
For the seller, generic drugs are expected to yield higher margins than brand-name ones (cf. Liu et al.
[2009]), so dispensing physicians are likely to sell more of the former. Physicians who are not dispensing
do not have direct incentives to favor one drug over the other. Insurers are unlikely to in°uence drug
choice as they are obliged to reimburse all licensed physicians according to a fee-for-service schedule which
is negotiated collectively between the insurers' association and the physicians' association. Criterion for
reimbursement is that the service is e±cacious, appropriate and economic for treating the patient's
illness. With this broad de¯nition and diagnostic information generally unavailable, insurers have limited
possibilities to in°uence physicians' decisions. However, the insurer's association monitors physicians
and reclaims payments from those who show { and fail to explain { much above average cost in a given
accounting period.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 starts of with a short review of the
literature. Section 3 contains a theoretical model of physician prescription behavior and a set of testable
hypotheses derived from it. The empirical strategy for hypothesis testing is explained in Section 3.2.
Section 4 contains a description of the data. Results are shown in Section 5. Section 6 rounds of with
summary and conclusions.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 2
2 Literature Review
Up to our knowledge, there is no Swiss study that analyzes the e®ect of PD on the choice of generic versus
brand-name drugs. Empirical studies of the e®ect of PD on total spending have not reached consistent
conclusions. Hunkeler [2008] corroborates the hypothesis that PD leads to margin optimization or even
margin maximization through dispensing packages and dosages with higher o±cial margins. He ¯nds
that companies entering the market for generics provide exactly these packages ¯rst before they broaden
the assortment of packages. Dummermuth [1993] compares two otherwise similar, neighboring cantons
(Lucerne and Argovia) with di®ering laws on drug dispensing and concludes that PD leads to slightly
higher drug and slightly higher total HCE in Lucerne. This ¯nding is in line with Beck et al. [2003] whose
regression analysis indicates a positive impact of PD on drug expenditures. By way of contrast, Vatter
and Rue°i [2003], who control for a very comprehensive set of political and socioeconomic covariates, ¯nd
a signi¯cantly negative e®ect of the share of dispensing physicians on average HCE. More surprisingly still,
Schleiniger et al. [2007] ¯nd a signi¯cantly negative e®ect of physician dispensing on drug expenditure
which is robust over several speci¯cations.
Liu et al. [2009] analyze the choice between generic and brand name drugs in Taiwan where PD is the
dominant dispensing system. They ¯nd that ¯nancial incentives markedly in°uence the decision between
drug versions. For example, institutions on global budgets are more likely to prescribe generic drugs
than if institutions are reimbursed fee-for-service. Moreover, cheaper drugs that yield smaller margins
on average are more often replaced by generics. Papers that are methodically closely related to ours
are Hellerstein [1998], Coscelli [1998] and Lundin [2000] who analyze the choice between generic versus
brand-name drugs in a pharmacy based system. Hellerstein argues that the information cost of prescribing
generics are likely higher than for brand-names because generics only appear after physicians collected
personal experiences with the brand-name drugs. Contrary to the `moral hazard' hypothesis, she ¯nds
that prescription is not in°uenced by the patients' insurance status. However, physicians who treat a
large share of patients in prepaid or Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) settings are more likely to
prescribe generics (conditional on insurance status). Her panel data speci¯cation also shows that a large
part of the unexplained variance can be attributed to the physician. The same claim can be made from
Lundin's results. However, Lundin ¯nds evidence for moral hazard because higher patient co-payments
increase the probability of generics being prescribed, while higher cost to the insurance companies do not.
Conscelli proves strong brand loyalty both among physicians and patients. His policy setting, however, is
special because Italian regulation forced generic and brand-name drugs, decreasing incentives to acquire
information about new generic drugs.
3 Model speci¯cation and hypotheses
3.1 Theoretical model of drug choice
Because of their central role in the resource allocation in health care markets, physician behavior has
spurred a very rich literature (cf. McGuire [2000] for an overview). The purpose of this section is to use3 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND HYPOTHESES 3
existing theoretical models to derive testable hypotheses about how physician dispensing in°uences drug
choice. The drugs for analysis are regarded as particularly unproblematic to substitute. Therefore, we
assume that the clinical bene¯t to the patient is the same for generic and brand-name drugs. However,
Hellerstein [1998] argues that the information cost of prescribing generic drugs are likely higher than
for brand-name drugs because the former are less aggressively marketed and less documented by clinical
evidence. In addition, generic drugs are introduced to the market only after physicians have collected
personal experience with the brand-name drug. Lundin [2000] also points out that physicians might feel
loyal to the producers of brand-name drugs because of R&D expenditures and its pioneering character,
which further increases the cost of describing a generic. In the following, the combined cost of prescribing
a generic (g) instead of a brand-name (b) drug are denoted by eg. The cost for prescribing b is normalized
to zero (eb = 0).
The ¯rst model corresponds to the much cited speci¯cation of Ellis and McGuire [1986]. Physician
behavior is modeled as driven by two factors, namely revenue (¦) and patient's bene¯t (B) from the
treatment. The extend to which the physician takes the patient's bene¯t as his goal is denoted by the
agency parameter ®. For example, an ® value of 0.5 implies that the physician attaches twice as much
weight to revenue than to patient bene¯ts (in monetary terms). With this in mind, the utility of physician
i from prescribing drug d to patient j is de¯ned as follows.
Vijd = ¦i;d + ®Bj;d ¡ ei;d with d = g;b (1)
As mentioned earlier, we assume that g and b are bioequivalent and therefore no di®erence between the
patient's bene¯t exists. Then the physician prescribes a generic drug if
Vijg ¡ Vijb = ¦i;g ¡ ¦i;b ¡ ei;g > 0: (2)
Hypothesis 1: Dispensing physicians are much more likely to prescribe the drug with the highest margin
than non-dispensing ones.
Hypothesis 2: Among the non-dispensing physicians (for whom ¦i;b = ¦i;g = 0), the share of generics
prescribed is likely very low because ei;g > 0.
Other authors have broadened physician agency by including the patient's utility of income into the
physician's consideration. For example, Bradley and Lesu [2006] have modeled physicians' utility as a
function of her revenue as well as the patient's total utility, which depends on medical bene¯ts from
treatment and disposable income. In a similar spirit, De Jaegher and Jegers [2000] and Gonul et al.
[2001] have argued that physicians who show consideration to their patients' ¯nances might attract
more patients than competitors who do not. For simplicity, we will assume that the patients' utility is
additively separable into income (Yj) and bene¯ts from medical care. Let µj denote patients' cost-sharing3 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND HYPOTHESES 4
rate, (Pb ¡ Pg) the price di®erence and u0fYjg the patients' marginal utility of income. A generic drug
would then be prescribed if
Vijg ¡ Vijb = [¦i;g ¡ ¦i;b ¡ ei;g] + ®[µj(Pb ¡ Pg)u0fYjg] > 0: (3)
Hypothesis 3: Generic drugs are prescribed more often to patients with higher cost-sharing as long as
Pb > Pg; 8g.
Hypothesis 4: Patient cost-sharing is more in°uential if the physician does not dispense on his own
account because again ¦i;b = ¦i;g = 0.
Hypothesis 5: Generic drugs are prescribed less to patients with higher incomes because of their lower
marginal utility of income.
Given Eq. (3), the incentive to prescribe g is very low for a non-dispensing physician who treats a high-
income or low cost-sharing patient. However, physicians might also consider social cost of ine±cient care.
With high and rapidly increasing HCE being one of the top concerns of the Swiss population, promoting
a cost-e±cient practice style could create a warm-glow e®ect of doing what is good for society. Moreover,
fear of tighter regulation in future or sanctions by insurers1 might make physicians care for society's cost.
Vijg ¡ Vijb = [¦i;g ¡ ¦i;b ¡ ei;g] + ®[µj(Pb ¡ Pg)u0fYjg] + °[(1 ¡ µj)(Pb ¡ Pg)] > 0: (4)
Hypothesis 6: Contributing to the social goal of cost-e±cient health care might provide an additional
motivation for prescribing the cheaper generic drug.
3.2 Econometric model speci¯cation
We analyze the prescribing behavior of physician using a dichotomous discrete choice model. The de-
pendent variable takes on the value one if the physician prescribes g and zero otherwise. According to
Ben-Akiva and Lerman [1985], we have to separate the utility physician i gets from prescribing drug
d = (b;g) to patient j into a deterministic and a random component, Uijd = Vijd + "ijd, where "ijd is
unobserved by the researcher. Hence, the probability that physician i chooses drug g if he faces patient
j is
Pijg = Pr[Uijg > Uijb] = Pr[Vijg + "ijg > Vijb + "ijb] = Pr["ijb ¡ "ijg < Vijg ¡ Vijb] (5)
and Vijg ¡ Vijb is given by Eq. (4). It represents the probability that the random term of the utility
function is smaller than the deterministic part which is observed by the researcher (cf. Train [2003]). We
specify the random term "ij = "ijb ¡ "ijg to follow the logistic distribution resulting in the binary logit
model speci¯cation. The choice probability is then given by
Pijg =
1
1 + exp(Vijg ¡ Vijb)
(6)
1 The insurers' association scrutinizes physicians having inexplicably high cost compared to their peers and occasionally
sues physicians.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND HYPOTHESES 5
which has a closed-form that facilitates to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates analytically and
allows to derive odds-ratios which enable a convenient and intuitive interpretation. To calculate the
choice probabilities, we are left with specifying the systematic component of the utility function (vij =
Vijg ¡ Vijb).
The deterministic part of the utility pertaining to the revenue component of Eq. (2) can be expressed
as (¦i;g¡¦i;b) = ¯1[(mg¡mb)¢PDi]. The physician's revenue is determined by the di®erence between the
drug margins (m) interacted with the dummy that indicates physician dispensing (PD). If the physician
does not sell the drug on his own account the revenue is zero as discussed previously. Unfortunately, we
can not observe the true margins the physicians obtain. They are the outcome of an individual bargaining
process between the physician and sales representatives. According to Liu et al. [2009] the drug's margin
increases with market size, competition, and reimbursement price but decreases with marginal cost. They
state that the marginal cost of generics have to be less than for brand-name drugs because of at least
three reasons. First, a company producing generics do not face the same mandatory expensive clinical
trials as in the case of brand-name drugs. Second, the cost of marketing the drug is lower for imitative
¯rms than for innovative ¯rms which have to propagate information about the new agent. Third, the
generic ¯rms concentrate their activities in the local market in contrast to the innovative ¯rms with their
international scope. O®ering higher discounts and therefore lower prices in some other countries could
have a negative rebound-e®ect and leading to lower reimbursement prices if reference pricing is applied.
This restricts the manufactures' o®ering of high discounts for brand-name drugs. Interviews with Swiss
market actors as wholesalers and physicians strengthen that the bargained margin for generics is generally
higher than for brand-name drugs. Hence, we assume that mg ¡ mb > 0 and because we do not observe
the exact values we just take into account that the sign of ¯1 is expected to be positive which means
that dispensing should increase the probability of choosing g. The information cost (eg) corresponding
to Eq. (2) can not be modeled explicitly and will be absorbed by the random term. Further, we include
a dummy for general practitioners (GP) to test if they di®er in their prescribing behavior from specialist.
The patients cost-sharing (µj) in Eq. (3) is included in the analysis using the patient-speci¯c health
insurance contract on the one hand and the drug-speci¯c co-payment rate on the other hand. The health
insurance contracts di®er in the deductible level (DL) as well as the contract type. If the physician
acts as a perfect agent, he would be interested in keeping the patient's out-of-pocket cost low. The
higher the DL and therefore the cost-sharing, the less we would expect to observe the brand-name drug
prescribed. The opposite could be the case for individuals with a low DL. The probability that the DL
and the co-payment will be exceeded anyway could lead the physician to prescribe the original as no
further out-of-pocket payments have to be borne by the patient which might prefer b over g. In addition,
the patient's co-payment rate for the brand-name drugs for all three investigated agents was increased
from 10 to 20% due to a law enacted in January 2006. To lower the HCE for pharmaceuticals all drugs
that exceed the price of the lowest available drug within the same class by 20% was imposed with the
higher co-payment. Hence, we can test if the cost-sharing a®ects the choice by including time-dummies
(T). Despite the e®ect of the increased co-payment they might control for an exogenous time-trend. We3 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND HYPOTHESES 6
expect a trend in favor of generics as the practitioners get more familiar to them and the experience
about side-e®ects become better known.
Because the rebated pharmaceutical prices are administrated in Switzerland even if the prices among
the generics di®er the price for the original remains constant which would lead to a perfect prediction if
we include them in the regression. For this reason we replace (Pb ¡ Pg) in Eq. (4) by one to take into
account that the price di®erence between b and g is strict positive for all combinations of package size
and dosage and has only an e®ect on the sign of the cost-sharing coe±cients because it enters Eq. (4)
multiplicatively. The interaction between PD and DL allows to evaluate if cost-sharing is more in°uential
if PD is present or not.
Concerning the patients' insurance contracts (CO) we control for deviations from the basic insurance
type. The patients could choose either a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or a family-doctor
contract. Further, we include a set of dummies for additional insurance options (IO) that could ex-
plain patient attitudes. The voluntary insurance for a broader coverage of rebated services could give
a hint if the patient is risk-averse or not while the accident insurance option is mostly an indication of
unemployment as the accident insurance is usually covered by the employer.
The hypothesis that generics are prescribed less to patients with higher income due to their lower
marginal utility of income is tested by including a dummy for high-income areas together with a set of
other location indicators (LI). These are used as proxies for the type of the commune the practice is
located in. Additionally, the presence of the expensive hospital insurance option could indicate that the
patient is wealthy.
We complete the econometric speci¯cation by including further LIs and some other variables (R)
which might e®ect the decision as patients' age and gender. Di®erent political attitudes and governments
could have an e®ect on the physicians awareness of HCE. In some Swiss cantons physician dispensing is
widely accepted or even desired while in others it is very disputed. In the latter case, the political and
social environment could a®ect the behavior of dispensing physicians trying to keep HCE low to make it
more accepted. To control for these e®ects we add 25 canton-dummies omitting Zurich as the reference
group. A dummy indicating if the prescription took place in the second-half of the year is included as well
because a prescription in the second-half of the year could be a®ected by the knowledge that deductible
and co-payment is already payed and that the patient will not have to bear the cost of the more expensive
brand-name drug. To control if there is a di®erence between prescribing b and g for di®erent dosage levels
and package size we include the contained dosages (in mg) and the pills per package of each prescription.
The deterministic utility therefore is given by
vij = ¯0 + ¯1PDij + ¯3GPi + ¯4DLj + ¯5COj + ¯6IOj + ¯7LIj + ¯8T + ¯9R: (7)
We discuss the results of the logistic regression using odds-ratios (ORs) along with their standard errors.
The concept of ORs and how they are calculated in the presence of interaction terms can be found in
Hosmer and Lemeshow [2000].4 DATA 7
4 Data
4.1 Investigated agents and the market shares for brand-name drugs
We investigate the physician's prescribing behavior using panel data from 2005 to 2007 for the three
agents omeprazole (o), amlodipine (a), and cipro°oxacin (c).2 Omeprazole is an agent that is utilized
to treat gastric and duodenal abscesses while amlodipine is a calcium channel blocker and used to treat
angina. Cipro°oxacin is a chemotherapeutic agent used to treat speci¯c bacterial infections. The reason
for investigating these agents is that there are many bioequivalent generic drugs available on the Swiss
market which facilitates the substitution.3 Further, the agent omeprazole belongs to the therapy group
with the highest turnover which secures many observed prescriptions in the data set. We observe 199,065
(o), 147,234 (a), and 95,745 (c) prescriptions. The data were provided by a major Swiss health insurance
company covering about 15 percent of the Swiss citizens.
The market share of the brand-name drug for each agent is depicted in Figure 1. In 2006, the patient's
co-payment for some brand-name drugs was increased from 10% to 20%. A®ected were original drugs for
which a generic drug existed for the same agent and whose sales price was 20% higher than the cheapest
generic4. This regime switch explains the drop in market share for brand-names between 2005 and 2006
as all three brand-names are a®ected. In our sample, Antra MUPS
R ° (o) had a market share of 16%
in 2005 but it decreased to 7% and 6% in the following two years. The market for omeprazole generics
was dominated by two drugs, Omed
R °5 and Omezol-Mepha MT
R °, both with a market share of about
one-third. Norvasc
R °, the brand-name drug for amlodipine lost its patent right in spring 2005 and lost
its market leading position to 19% within the same year and leveled o® on about 15% since then. In
contrast, the generic Amlodipin-Mepha
R ° expanded in the same period from 18% to 37% (2006) and 38%
(2007). The pioneer drug for cipro°oxacin, Ciproxin
R °, was halved from 25% (2005) to 13% (2006, 2007).
4.2 Physician and patient descriptives
In the analyzed data we record 7,522 (o), 6,016 (a), and 7,698 (c) physicians. The share of PD varies
between 34% and 44% depending on the agent. The share of GPs dominates the share of specialized
practitioners and lies between 67% and 79%. The areas according to the community typology of the
Swiss Statistical O±ce are de¯ned as urban, suburban, high-income, touristic, industry & tertiary, rural
& commuter, mixed agriculture, and pure agriculture areas. The majority of physicians have their practice
in urban (47%) or suburban (25%) areas.
The 61,825 patients receiving omeprazole as well as the 58,489 patients getting cipro°oxacin reveal
an average age of about 57 years whereof 40% are male. The 27,080 patients obtaining amlodipine have
an average age of 70 years and a share of 46% males. Only a small number of insureds deviated from the
basic insurance plan by signing an HMO (2-4%) or family-doctor (6-7%) contract. In contrast, a high
2 ATC-code: omeprazole (A02BC01), amlodipine (C08CA01), cipro°oxacin (J01MA02). For more details about the
investigated agents see www.drugbank.ca/drugs.
3 Number of available generics on the Swiss market (2005{2007): omeprazole (11), amlodipine (12), cipro°oxacin (11).
4 Art.38a KLV
5 In 2007, the producer renamed Omed to Omeprazol Sandoz Eco for marketing reasons. Apart from that the two drugs
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Figure 1: Market share of brand-name drug between March, 2005 and December, 2007
share of about 87-90% of the insured signed at least one of the additional voluntary insurance options
which broaden the rebated services. 65-82% possess an accident coverage while 21-26% have a hospital
insurance. The median deductible is lowest possible (CHF 300) for all agents.
5 Estimation results
We estimate two di®erent model speci¯cations for each of the three agents to test the hypotheses stated
in Section 3.1. The likelihood-ratio test of random-e®ects against pooled regression indicates that the
panel-level variance is very important in our study. The proportion of the total variance contributed
by the panel-level variance component (½) can be used to test if an unobserved e®ect is present (cf.
Wooldridge [2002]). For all agents and models, ½ is very high and the likelihood-ratio test of ½ being zero
can be rejected with a p-value lower than 0.000. The ½-values are 0.7 (o), 0.5 (a), and 0.6 (c). This is in
line with the ¯ndings of Lundin [2000] which estimates ½ = 0:4, Hellerstein [1998], and Coscelli [1998].
5.1 The e®ect of physician's revenue
The coe±cient of main interest in our study is the e®ect of physician dispensing on the choice between
brand-name and generic drugs. In the case of omeprazole the OR pertaining to PD is 3.6 indicating that
if the drug is sold by a physician the probability that the patient receives a generic drug is 3.6 times higher
no matter if he is a GP or a specialist (insigni¯cant interaction of PD and GP). Compared to specialized
practitioners the likelihood of prescribing generics is twice as high for GPs. This could be a sign that
GPs with a lower average income compared to their specialized colleagues are more sensitive to margin
maximization due to a higher marginal utility of income. The models for amlodipine and cipro°oxacin
lead to signi¯cant interactions of PD and GP. Therefore, the likelihood of prescribing g depends both on
PD and GP simultaneously. The OR are then calculated as OR = exp(^ ¯PD + ^ ¯GP + ^ ¯PD¢GP), where ^ ¯ is
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)5 ESTIMATION RESULTS 10
to non-dispensing specialists. The likelihood to prescribe g for dispensing specialists is 2.5 times higher
for amlodipine but 1.4 times lower for cipro°oxacin drugs. Non-dispensing GPs prescribe g 1.9 (a) and
2.2 (c) times more likely. The strongest preference for g are found for dispensing GPs with 7.8 (o), 6.8
(a), and 6.6 (c).
Assuming that mg > mb (see Section 3.1) we can conclude that physician dispensing increases the
likelihood of prescribing the generic drug version which might be driven by the higher margin. The
estimated ORs support this for all agents whether they are GPs or not with one exception, dispensing
specialized physicians in the case of cipro°oxacin.
As neither the margin nor the information cost of generics (eg) can not be modeled explicitly the
higher probability of prescribing g can arise because of Hypothesis 1 or 2 and can not be distinguished.
Nevertheless, there might be other reasons why a dispensing physician would choose the cheaper generic
drug. First, they have to ¯nance their storage which binds capital and causes opportunity costs which
are lower the cheaper the wholesales prices of the drug is. Second, he could be better informed about
generics (in availability and prices) because he is targeted by marketing activities. Unfortunately, all
these e®ects can not be analyzed separately in our analysis. However, the conclusion that can be drawn
is that PD supports the substitution of expensive brand-names by cheaper generic drugs for di®erent
reasons. As long as physician dispensing does not result in an increase in drug use through supplier-
induced demand, the presence of PD contributes to lower pharmaceutical HCE. To answer this question
additional investigations are necessary whereon we will focus our future research.
5.2 The role of physician agency
Even if there is an information asymmetry about availability of di®erent drug versions and sales prices
between physicians and patients, individuals with higher DLs are interested in receiving the cheaper
generic because they have to bear the full cost until deductible and co-payment is fully paid. They could
therefore in°uence the physicians drug choice.
The ORs for the included deductible levels are often insigni¯cant or do not take on the expected
values. This might be the case because 68-74% of the patients are insured with a deductible of CHF 300
and 21-23% with CHF 500 making it di±cult to estimate accurate ORs for all other levels. Until 2005,
the highest deductible was CHF 1,500. Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that it is still the third
biggest group. Hence, we focus on these three deductible levels. For CHF 500, the OR of receiving g is
1.4 (o) and 1.1 (a) while for CHF 1,500 they are 2.4 (o) and 1.3 (a). For cipro°oxacin we ¯nd only a
signi¯cant OR for CHF 1,000 which is 1.4. Even if the distribution of deductible levels is skewed towards
the lowest two levels these ¯ndings support Hypothesis 3 because patients with higher cost-sharing have
a higher probability of getting the generic drug.
To test Hypothesis 4 which predicts that patients' cost-sharing is more in°uential if the physician does
not dispense on his own account we interact the deductible (as continuous variable)6 with the dummy
for PD (model B). Increasing the patients deductible by CHF 100 increases the likelihood of receiving g
by 5% if PD is present and 10% in the absence of PD for omeprazole. While the ORs are insigni¯cant
6 The deductible is included in CHF 100.6 CONCLUSIONS 11
for amlodipine the e®ect for cipro°oxacin is signi¯cant but very small which supports Hypothesis 4.
The higher cost-sharing has a lower e®ect towards g for dispensing physicians than for non-dispensing
ones. Nevertheless, the interaction of PD and the year dummy does not support Hypothesis 4 because
dispensing physicians did not react less sensitive to the change of the patients' co-payment rate for
omeprazole than non-dispensing ones. However, it is unclear if the e®ect really represents the increase in
co-payment or other exogenous e®ects.
Testing whatever Hypothesis 5 is true or not we focus our interest onto two variables. First, the OR
for the hospital insurance indicates if a patient can a®ord the expensive contract option which increases
the comfort in case of a hospital stay. Throughout all agents and models the ORs indicate that there
is a strong preference for brand-name drugs as predicted by Hypothesis 5. The probability of facing b
increases strongly by 50% and 32% for omeprazole and amlodipine, respectively, while it increases by
8% for cipro°oxacin. Second, the dummy for high-income areas can be used as a proxy for the patients'
¯nancial situation. Patients living in areas with a higher density of wealthier people receive the brand-
name drug 2.2 (o) and 1.8 (a) times more likely than the urban population. This supports Hypothesis
5 that higher income and therefore lower marginal utility of income results in less forgone utility due to
the higher price of the brand-name drug and the stronger preference for originals.
One might criticize that the dispensing physician does not react on the individual patient he faces with
choosing between g and b because he has already decided what pharmaceuticals to have in his portfolio.
Nevertheless, he could have an expectation which kind of patients he will face from past visits and store
the best drug for this clientele. Further, the share of PD that is brand-loyal7 falls with the number of
prescribed packages and is between 20 and 30%. The share of brand-loyal non-dispensing physicians is
always lower. This ¯nding supports Coscelli [1998] that there is strong physicians' brand-loyalty but still
most physicians prescribe not only one speci¯c drug per agent.
Finally, the share of HMO insureds a®ects the likelihood of g throughout all agents. The HMO
patients receive g between 1.4 and 2.2 times more likely which coincides with the ¯ndings of Hellerstein
[1998].
6 Conclusions
Many politicians blame physician dispensing (PD) to increase health care expenditure for pharmaceuticals
or to undermine the independence of drug prescription and prescriber's income leading to suboptimal
medication. For these reasons PD is not allowed in most OECD countries. In contrast, Switzerland allows
exceptions for some regions upon the availability of pharmacies within a de¯ned range. This enables to
investigate if dispensing physicians reveal di®erent prescribing patterns compared to their colleagues
which do only prescribe the drug and where it is sold subsequently by a pharmacy. The analyzed agents
omeprazole, amlodipine, and cipro°oxacin are all agents with high turnovers and which are prescribed
very often. Therefore, many generic substitutes entered the market after patent expiration.
7 Brand-loyalty means that the physician prescribed only one drug to all patients.6 CONCLUSIONS 12
Assuming that the unobserved margin for generics is higher than for brand-name drugs (Liu et al.
[2009]) we ¯nd evidence that PD increases the likelihood of generic prescription due to ¯nancial incentives
leaving the optimality of the medication una®ected because of the drugs' bioequivalence. Because of the
unobservability of the actually granted margins and the information cost of generics we are not able to
separate the di®erence in preference for generics and brand-name drugs between dispensing and non-
dispensing physicians into a pure margin- and cost-e®ect. Dispensing physicians are targeted by sales
representatives with marketing activities and are therefore better informed about availability and prices
of drugs than their counterparts. Hence, eg is lower them leading to more prescribed generics in the
case of PD. Another reason than margin and information cost could lead to a preference for generics.
Dispensing physicians have to ¯nance their storage which binds capital and creates opportunity costs.
We ¯nd evidence that patients' cost-sharing has an e®ect on the choice between generics and brand-
name drugs. The likelihood of receiving the generic drug version increases for patients with a higher
deductible compared to the lowest level. The increased patients' co-payment rate for the brand-name
drugs in 2006 supports the e®ect of cost-sharing. Moreover, cost-sharing is more in°uential if the physician
dose not dispense on his own account. In contrast, no di®erent choice pattern could be found due to the
co-payment rate between dispensing and non-dispensing physicians.
Finally, the odds-ratios pertaining to the income proxies (high-income area and hospital insurance)
support the expectation that wealthier patients have a higher probability of receiving brand-name drugs
because the price di®erence between the two versions has a less sensitive e®ect for them due to their lower
marginal utility of income. The administration of reimbursement prices for dispensed pharmaceuticals
entails that the drug prices do not vary over time and prescriptions. This averts to answer the question
if physicians in general are concerned about high pharmaceutical prices and interested in cost-e±cient
health care which might increase the share of non-dispensing physicians to prescribe generic drugs.
PD seems to fuel the substitution of brand-name drugs by generics because of physician's margin-
maximization e®orts. In the considered period generics were 30 percent cheaper than originals. However,
the reimbursement prices seem to leave enough leeway for pharmaceutical companies to grant attractive
margins and gaining physicians over for generics. This results in lower HCE for pharmaceuticals as
long as PD does not fuel supplier-induced drug use and does not increase the prescription of economic
ine±cient package sizes. The ¯ndings of Schleiniger et al. [2007] of lower drug expenditure with PD would
indicate that the cost-savings due to more generics is at least not overcompensated by expenditure due
to supplier-induced drug use and/or economically ine±cient dispensed packages. However, this problem
is independent from the choice between b and g. Lowering the reimbursement price for generics to 60
percent of brand-name drugs as enacted in Switzerland in 2008 could therefore result in an ambiguous
development of HCE for drugs as the substitution e®ect slows down. The overall e®ect of PD on HCE
can not be answered here and is left for future research.REFERENCES 13
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